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Abstract: It is often assumed that judges are reluctant to review directors’ business 
judgments, which contributes to a lack of director accountability, particularly in large 
companies. This claim has never been systematically interrogated. This paper therefore 
analyses English and Welsh cases to ascertain whether judges do review and impose liability 
for directors’ judgments, whether this has altered from the mid-nineteenth century until the 
present, or varies by cause of action, and what types of company or claimant are involved. It 
finds that challenges to business judgment have been successful over the whole time period, 
with a marked increase in legal liability since 2007.  This cannot be linked to changes in 
substantive law, but probably a greater willingness by claimants in insolvent companies to 
mount challenges to business judgment. Nevertheless liability levels remain low, and largely 
confined to private companies.  
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A. Introduction  
It is rare for directors to be sued by their companies or shareholders, or subjected to regulatory 
sanctions for business decisions that cause harm. One key reason could be the view set out in 
the case law and literature that directors’ business judgments are immune from judicial review.1   
The extent to which directors should be accountable for business judgments is 
contentious. However although several jurisdictions, including the United States and Australia, 
have a ‘business judgment rule’, a rule of law that protects directors' decisions from judicial 
scrutiny in most cases, no such formal rule exists in England and Wales, and the extent to which 
the courts defer to directors’ judgments, and when, has never been systematically examined.  
This is a significant gap in knowledge that raises important social, legal and practical 
issues. Following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and corporate collapses such as that of 
Carillion plc, there have been increased calls in the media, by policy-makers, and by 
politicians for greater director accountability before courts or regulators,2  for decisions that 
may be misjudgements rather than misconduct.3  Accountability is seen as necessary to 
legitimise the grear power exercised by the directors of public and large private companies, 
and to promote good governance behaviour4 and market trust.5 If business judgments are 
 
1  See for example, Carlen v Drury (1812) 1 V & B 154,158; Re Elgindata [1991] BCLC 959, 993-4; 
Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum [1974] AC 821, 832.  
2  See for example, Parliamentary  Commission on Banking Standards, Changing Banking For Good, HC 
175-I  (2013) 8; Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Transparency and Trust: Enhancing the 
Transparency of UK Company Ownership and Increasing Trust in UK Business Discussion Paper (July 2015) 
para 41; S Sadan, ‘Carillion’s Collapse exposes deep corporate governance failings’ Financial Times  14 
February 2018. 
3  K Burgess, ‘Carillion’s board: misguided or incompetent? The directors ticked all the good governance 
boxes, yet the contractor still collapsed’ Financial Times 17 January 2018. 
4  J Roberts, T McNulty and P Stiles, ‘Beyond Agency Conceptions of the Work of the Non-Executive 
Director: Creating Accountability in the Boardroom’ (2005) 16 British Journal of Management S5-S26. 
5  J Loughrey, ‘Smoke and Mirrors? Disqualification, Accountability and Market Trust’ (2015) 9 Law 
and Financial Markets Review 50. 
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protected from review this could be a significant factor in the present lack of litigation against 
these directors, particularly in listed public companies.6 This is because structural safeguards 
render it unlikely that these directors will breach fiduciary duties. However, as the financial 
crisis demonstrates, such safeguards do not eliminate the risk of poor business decisions but 
these might be immune from judicial review as business judgments. Even a mistaken belief 
that the courts will not review business judgments will deter potential claimants.  
Accountability is also important in small private owner-managed companies, and 
litigation is seen as a mechanism to promote such accountability. Most litigation against 
directors occurs in these companies, but it is not known whether this involves reviewing 
business judgment, rather than challenging misconduct. 7  Failing to review business judgment 
could reduce the utility of litigation to promote accountability. Conversely review could be 
problematic: it has been argued that holding directors liable for poor decisions could have 
adverse economic impacts by deterring entrepreneurial risk taking and discouraging able 
people from becoming directors.8  
However despite the importance of the issue, little is known about how courts deal 
with cases that raise matters of business judgment. This paper investigates this lacuna by 
analysing English and Welsh case-law to identify how the courts have responded to 
challenges to directors’ business judgment over time.  In order to do this we created a dataset 
of 130 cases, coded across 25 categories. Although the earliest case in the study dates from 
 
6  J Armour, ‘Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance’ in J Armour and J Payne (eds.), 
Rationality in Company Law: Essays in Honour of Dan Prentice (Hart Publishing, 2009), 85. However see M 
Moore,  ‘Redressing Risk Oversight Failure in UK and US Listed Companies: Lessons from the RBS and 
Citigroup Litigation’ (2017) 18 European Business Organization Law Review 733. 
7  R Tomasic and F Akinbami, ‘Shareholder Activism and Litigation Against UK Banks: The Limits of 
Company Law and the Desperate Resort to Human Rights Claims?’ in J Loughrey (ed), Directors Duties and 
Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of the Fnancial Crisis (Edward Elgar, 2011),158-162.  
8   V Finch, ‘Company Directors: Who Cares about Skill and Care?’ (1992) 55 MLR 179; A Hicks, 
‘Directors’ Liability for Management Errors’ (1994) 110 LQR 390; S Worthington, ‘The Duty to Monitor: A 
Modern View of the Director’s Duty of Care’ in F Patfield (ed), Perspectives on Company Law: 2 (Kluwer Law 
International, 1997); C Riley, ‘The Company Director’s Duty of Care and Skill: the Case for an Onerous but 
Subjective Standard’ (1999) 62 MLR 697, 709.  
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1742, directors’ judgments began to be considered by courts in a sustained fashion about 150 
years ago, when company law was developing, and the Companies Act 1862 was regarded as 
a ground-breaking piece of legislation. Directors ’actions were being placed under the 
spotlight and duties that they were to fulfil were being developed by the courts through case 
law.  
The study considers whether judges do review directors’ judgments and whether, and 
how, as the law developed, levels of challenges to, and liability for directors’ business 
judgment altered. It specifically considers: whether the overall numbers of cases involving 
consideration of directors’ business judgment changed over time or varied by cause of action, 
company or claimant type; whether there have been changes over time in levels of liability in 
different categories of case involving challenges to business judgment; and what factors 
might influence these findings.  
There is little empirical work in the corporate law field generally or in relation to 
business judgment specifically, yet an empirical approach has ‘the ability to reveal 
counterintuitive patterns and to test our basic assumptions about the world.’9 Our empirical 
data suggests that, contrary to orthodoxy, courts do review business judgments and that legal 
challenges to, and rates of liability for, business judgment have increased since 2007. This 
cannot be linked to changes in substantive law. The increase in numbers of legal challenges 
may be due to a greater willingness by liquidators, administrators and the Insolvency Service 
to pursue litigation, and an increase in the number of cases captured in on-line databases. 
However these factors cannot explain increased rates of liability.  
The paper is structured as follows: it first examines the meaning and importance of 
director accountability and how judicial review of directors’ business judgment constitutes an 
 
9 A Dignam and P Oh, ‘Disregarding the Salomon Principle: An Empirical Analysis, 1885-2014’ (2019) 39 
OJLS  16, 19. 
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accountability mechanism. The following sections describe our methodology.  The last sections 
set out our findings, and the analysis of those findings, before the paper concludes.    
 
B. Business Judgment and Director Accountability 
 
For many years, and particularly since the GFC, the concept of accountability has been used 
increasingly in government reports, discussion papers and the academic literature on 
corporate governance. Together with transparency it has been described as ‘the most 
important elements of good corporate governance.’10 The Cadbury Report said many years 
ago, that ‘(t)he issue for corporate governance is how to strengthen the accountability of 
boards of directors to shareholders.’11 More reently a key government policy response to the 
GFC was to make companies more accountable to shareholders and the public.12   
The need for accountability is often linked to agency problems arising from the 
dispersion of ‘ownership’ and control in Anglo-American public companies. Agency 
problems are created by the fact that in these companies the power to run the company is 
placed in the hands of the board of directors rather than the shareholders, who are loosely 
referred to as the owners of a company, which creates the risk that directors will shirk or 
pursue their own interests rather than those of shareholders’.  
Agency problems also arise in private companies: opportunistic behaviour by majority 
shareholders can result in the oppression of minority shareholders. 13 These can be 
 
 10  The definition appears at: 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090902193559/berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/businesslaw/corp-
governance/page15267.html > accessed 28 February 2018. 
11  Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance under the chairmanship of 
Sir Adrian Cadbury (Gee Publishing,1992), [6.1]. 
12  Department for Business Innovation and Skills and HM Treasury, Making Companies More 
Accountable to Shareholders and the Public (updated 9 December 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/making-companies-more-ACcountable-to-shareholders-and-the-
public > accessed 12 October 2018. 
13  R Kraakman, J Armour, P Davies, L Enriques, H Hansmann and G Hertig, The Anatomy of Corporate 
Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2017), 30. 
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particularly acute in small owner-managed companies, as shareholders typically fail to 
formalise many of their understandings about how the company should be run, or fail to 
envisage the circumstances that later arise.14  Agency problems between shareholders and 
unsecured creditors are also particularly acute in  such companies as these are more likely to 
continue to trade when insolvent and to take excessive risks with creditors’ money than larger 
firms.15 In addition the Government has acknowledged that ‘the conduct and governance of 
large (private) companies…has a sizeable impact on the interests of employees, suppliers, 
customers and others’16 which creates a need for accountability in relation to directors of 
these companies.17  
Many explanations for accountability also emphasise its link with power.18 In many 
fields accountability is something that is required as an exchange for the grant of authority.19 
The essential rationale for board accountability is said by many to enable boards to have 
legitimacy in relation to the exercise of the power they have.20 By addressing the use and 
abuse of authority and power, accountability is designed to protect certain people or groups, 
which in the context of Anglo-American corporate law and governance, comprises the 
shareholders. 21   
 
14  R Goddard, ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Sections 459-461 of the Companies ACt 1985’ 
(1999) Company Lawyer 66, 69; see also O Hart, ‘Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications’ 
(1995) 105 The Economic Journal 678, 680. 
15  R Mokal, ‘An Agency Cost Analysis of the Wrongful Trading Provisions: Redistribution, Perverse 
Incentives and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (2000) 59 CLJ 335, 353–354. 
16   Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy Corporate Governance Reform: The 
Government’s Response to the Green Paper Consultation  (August 2017), 40. 
17  Ibid, 43. 
18  A Licht, ‘Accountability and Corporate Governance’ (September 2002) 1 
<http://ssrn.com/abstrACt=328401> accessed 31 August 2018. 
19  A Sinclair, ‘The Chameleon of ACcountability: Forms and Discourses’ (1995) 20 Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 219,  221. 
20  M Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Hart Publishing, 2013), 35; A Keay, 
‘Exploring the Rationale for Board Accountability in Corporate Governance’ (2014) 29 Australian Journal of 
Corporate Law 115.  
21  A Licht, ‘Accountability and Corporate Governance’ (September 2002) 17 
<http://ssrn.com/abstrACt=328401> accessed 31 August 2018. 
7 
 
Accountability has also been linked to restoring and protecting market trust by 
deterring undesirable market conduct, and by reassuring market participants that steps will be 
taken against those who act in an untrustworthy fashion.22 A lack of accountability can create 
a perception that trust destroying behaviour can be engaged in with impunity, and thus deter 
participation in the market.23 This can be an issue with companies of all kinds. In terms of 
public companies, the manner in which the banks were run prior to the GFC and the fact that 
no one appeared to be held accountable, was acknowledged as damaging public trust.24 
Meanwhile in 2013 the Government’s overarching policy of ‘Making Companies More 
Accountable to Shareholders and the Public’ addressed a loss of trust by shareholders and the 
public in the way that companies in general were run, and contained measures aimed at 
owner-managers of smaller private companies whose activities caused harm to creditors.25 
More recently the Government’s Green Paper on Corporate Governance set out proposals 
aimed at ensuring that public companies and large private companies ‘earn and keep the trust 
and confidence of their customers, employees and the wider public’ by promoting better 
corporate governance by strengthening accountability.26   
 
C. Litigation as an Accountability Process 
 
 
22  Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Transparency and Trust: Enhancing the Transparency 
of UK Company Ownership and Increasing Trust in UK Business Discussion Paper (July 2015) 53; 
Transparency and Trust: Enhancing the Transparency of UK Company Ownership and Increasing Trust in UK 
Business Government Response (April 2015) 4, 13. 
23  J Loughrey, ‘Smoke and Mirrors? Disqualification, Accountability and Market Trust’ (2015) 9 Law 
and Financial Markets Review 50, 52. 
24  V Cable, ‘Trust: Why it Matters’ Reform Conference on Responsible Capitalism (15th July 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/reform-conference-on-responsible-capitalism > accessed, 31August 
2018. 
25  Department for Business Innovation and Skills and HM Treasury, Making Companies More 
Accountable to Shareholders and the Public (updated 9 December 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/making-companies-more-ACcountable-to-shareholders-and-the-
public > accessed 12 October 2018.  
26  Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance Reform Green Paper 
(November 2016), 7. See also Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy Corporate Governance 
Reform: The Government’s Response to the Green Paper Consultation  (August 2017), 7, 37. 
8 
 
While accountability is seen as important, it is a notoriously difficult concept to define. One 
study that focuses on its meaning in corporate governance argues that accountability describes 
a process involving several stages.27 First a person or entity -in this case, the board and 
individual directors- must be called to account, that is, obliged to recount or report their conduct 
to a third party (in this case, the shareholders). The next stage requires that directors must 
explain and justify their decisions, actions and omissions. This stage is key to the idea that 
accountability includes the notion of being answerable. The third stage is that shareholders can 
ask questions and debate the directors’ conduct before passing judgment. Finally, there must 
be the possibility of consequences, positive or negative, being visited upon the directors.28    
Adopting this definition, it can be seen that there are various mechanisms by which 
directors can be held to account: shareholders can hold boards to account at the general meeting 
for example.  Litigation is just another, ex post, accountability mechanism but unlike other 
mechanisms that are accepted as desirable, the extent to which directors should be held 
accountable through judicial processes for decisions that have poor outcomes is controversial. 
For example the Carillion Report was concerned that directors should not be subject to an 
‘unreasonable degree of legal exposure’ in relation to the decisions they take, and commented 
that it should not be ‘left to the courts to clear up the corporate mess’.29  Much of the debate 
centres around the extent to which directors should be accountable for breaching their duty of 
care when business judgments have adverse impacts,30 though challenges to directors’ business 
judgments can arise in a wider range of litigation scenarios. Arguments against such liability 
 
27   A Keay and  J Loughrey, ‘The Framework for Board Accountability in Corporate Governance’ (2015) 
35 Legal  Studies  252. 
28  R Mulgan ‘Accountability’: An Ever Expanding Concept?’ (2000) 78 Public  Admininistration 555; M 
Bovens, T Schillemans and P T’Hart ‘Does Public Accountability Work? An Assessment Tool’ (2008) 86 
Public Admininistration 225. 
29  House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, 
Carillion (16 May 2018)  HC-769,  70 
30  M Eisenberg, ‘The Divergence of Standards of Conduct from Standards of Review in Corporate Law’ 
(1993) 62 Fordham Law Review 437, 445-446;  C Riley, ‘The Company Director’s Duty of Care and Skill: the 
Case for an Onerous but Subjective Standard’ (1999) 62 MLR 697, 712. 
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include that it would over-deter risk-taking and discourage people from taking up directorial 
roles,31  that courts lack the ability to assess business judgments and do not adopt the same 
approach to risk taking as directors, and that hindsight bias will affect judicial decision-
making.32  
Nevertheless calls for director accountability that succeeded the GFC and corporate 
crises seem to demand precisely this type of accountability.33 It is beyond the scope of this 
article to explore in detail why, but one possibility is that when people have been harmed by 
decisions, adequate accountability entails the possibility of rectification or retribution through 
a judicial process.34  Another is that this form of accountability is considered necessary to deter 
the conduct that has caused harm.35 Yet as canvassed previously, because little is known about 
how challenges to directors’ business judgment fare in the courts, it is unclear to what extent 
litigation does, and could, operate as an accountability mechanism in relation to such conduct. 
It is to this that the remainder of the paper turns.  
 
D. Research Methods 
 
1. Case selection rationale 
 
In order to assess how the courts approach business judgment we conducted a database search 
using Lexis and Westlaw for cases involving directors’ business judgment.  The first 
 
31  Eisenberg, ibid;  Riley, ibid, 712 ; B Cheffins and B Black, ‘Outside Director Liability Across 
Countries’ (2006) 84 Texas Law Review 1385, 1389. 
32  H Arkles and C A Schipani, ‘Medical Malpractice v. The Business Judgment Rule: Differences in 
Hindsight Bias,’ (1994) 73 Oregon Law Review 587, 595-600 . 
33  See for example Parliamentary Committee on Banking Standards, Changing Banking for Good HC 
175-1 (2013), 10.  
34   R Mulgan, Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies (Palgrave MacMillan, 
2003) 9. 
35  On deterrence and shareholder litigation see E Kamar, ‘Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate 
Corporate Law’ (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law Review 887. 
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challenge was assessing what to look for: because there is no business judgment rule in 
England and Wales and the courts rarely use the term ‘business judgment’, determining what 
cases concern directors’ business judgment required an assessment by us as to what cases to 
include. Below we explain the rationales underpinning the categories of cases we selected for 
the database.  
We included all cases in which the cause of action includes a claim for a breach of duty 
of care at common law and under section 174 of the Companies Act 2006, or failure to take 
reasonable care, or negligence by a director. It has been judicially recognised that duty of care 
claims involve reviewing business judgment.36 In Australia, the statutory business judgment 
rule is associated with breach of duty of care claims only.37 The courts must assess whether 
directors acted with competence, and not solely, as with the other duties, whether decisions 
were improper, or actually or potentially self-serving. This entails challenging the substance 
and/or process of directors’ judgment.  
All wrongful trading cases under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 were included. 
Under section 214(2)(b) a director of a company that has subsequently become insolvent may 
be liable for wrongful trading if they allowed the company to continue trading and ‘at some 
time before the commencement of winding up of the company, [the director] knew or ought to 
have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into 
insolvent liquidation.’ As decisions to allow companies in financial difficulties to continue 
trading have been classified by the courts as business judgments,38 section 214 cases involve 
decisions by directors that are business judgments and/or involve courts determining what a 
reasonable business judgment would have been.   
 
36  Optaglio Ltd v Tethal [2015] EWCA Civ 1002 at [23];Carlyle Capital Corporation Ltd. v. Conway  
Judgment of the Royal Court Guernsey of 4th September 2017 not yet reported, at [546], [1223] [1923].  
(applying English law) 
37  Corporations Act 2001 (Aust), s 180(2).  




Also included were cases involving the common law duty to act in good faith in the 
company’s interests and its codified replacement in the Companies Act 2006, section 172(1), 
and cases involving the director’s common law duty to take account of creditor interests where 
a company is insolvent, nearly insolvent or in bad financial circumstances, which is now 
included in the Companies Act 2006, namely section 172(3). Cases in which directors breached 
either of these duties in bad faith were not included because they require the courts to review 
the propriety of directors’ conduct and motives, rather than the merits of a judgment made on 
the company’s behalf. We only included cases in which directors had inadvertently overlooked, 
or turned a blind eye to, considering the company’s or creditor interests.39  In determining 
whether there is a breach of duty in these circumstances, the courts assess whether a reasonable 
director exercising their judgment to act in the company’s interests, could have acted in the 
way the respondent director did.40 If not, the director will be liable. This requires the court to 
assess whether what the director did could have been the product of a reasonable business 
judgment, had a judgment been made. Thus, while these cases do not, strictly, involve a review 
of an actual judgment, they do involve the courts assessing the merits of what directors did, as 
if such a judgment had been made. In relation to section 172(1) we also included cases where 
a director failed to take account of a relevant factor (those in section 172(1)(a) – (f)) when 
making a decision.41  
Cases in which directors have been disqualified from being a director, acting as receiver 
of a company’s property or being concerned or taking part in the promotion, formation or 
management of a company in any way, directly or indirectly were included.42  The most 
 
39  Extrasure Travel Insurances Limited v Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598.  
40  Charterbridge Corp Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1969] 2 All ER 1185; Colin Gwyer v London Wharf 
(Limehouse) Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 153, [74]. 
41  These include: the likely consequences of any decision in the long term; the interests of the company's 
employees; the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others;  the 
impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment; the desirability of the company 
maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct; and the need to act fairly as between members 
of the company.  
42  Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 s 1(1)(a). 
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common ground for disqualification is section 6 of the Company Directors’ Disqualification 
Act 1986 which provides for disqualification where a person’s conduct as a director of a 
company that has become insolvent makes them unfit to be concerned in the management of a 
company. Disqualification was included in order to examine the courts’ approach to business 
judgment in public enforcement proceedings (proceedings are instigated by the Insolvency 
Service on behalf of the Secretary of State for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy). Section 
6 disqualification cases have also been treated as leading cases of the standard of care expected 
of directors in relation to their duty of care and so complement and augment section 174.43  
However there are large numbers of disqualification cases and many involve fraud or 
breaches of fiduciary duties, or other provisions of the companies legislation. To make the best 
use of resources, we only included cases that used the terms ‘business judgment’, ‘commercial 
judgment’  ‘commercial decision’44, or that referred to directors’ judgments45 or that identified 
issues as being a ‘business matter’.46 We also included cases in which the courts determined 
that the judgments concerned were not, or not merely, commercial misjudgments. The 
boundaries of the concept of business judgment in England and Wales are so undefined that it 
was not clear whether these were really not business judgments, or were business judgments 
that the courts will not defer to. The courts themselves disagree on this point.47  We may not 
therefore have captured all disqualification cases involving business judgment. Nevertheless 
examining how courts respond when business judgment is expressly mentioned may be a more 
accurate guide to judges’ attitude to business judgment than cases in which it is an invisible 
issue. 
 
43  Re Barings plc (No 5) [2000] 1 BCLC 523. 
44  We did however exclude Re Brand Management Services Ltd [2016] EWHC 2821 (Ch) as it was a 
serious fraud case, and business judgment was only mentioned in passing. 
45  Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821, 835.  
46  Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd  [1925] Ch 407, 408.  
47  See for example the difference of opinion between the first instance judge and the Court of Appeal in 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Gray and another [1995] 1 BCLC 276.  
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Finally unfair prejudice cases were included under section section 459 of the 
Companies Act 1985 and under section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 which replaced it 
unchanged. 48  This minority protection remedy is the most commonly used shareholder 
litigation remedy and so the most common private accountability mechanism against directors. 
Cases were selected on the same basis as the disqualification cases. 
Initially cases under the Companies Act 2006 for permission to bring a derivative claim 
were included but were subsequently removed. The decision whether to allow the company to 
pursue an action has been described as a commercial decision.49 In determining whether to 
permit a claim to proceed, the courts ask what decision a reasonable hypothetical director 
would have made.50 However as they do not necessarily review an actual director’s judgment, 
these cases did not assist with whether the courts are prepared to review and impose liability 
for directors’ judgments  
Cases often included multiple causes of action. For example a duty of care case could 
includes claims for breach of fiduciary duty,51 or a wrongful trading case might include a 
preference claim.52 Such cases were included, but were read carefully to track how the courts 
approached the ‘business judgment’ cause of action separately from the other causes of action 
and to ascertain if liability was imposed for the business judgment cause of action (whether or 
not it was also imposed on other grounds). Only the ‘business judgment’ causes of action were 
 
48  The provision replaced the oppression remedy found in the Companies Act 1948. 
49  Re Wishart [2009] CSIH 65; 2009 SLT 812, [37].  
50  Companies Act 2006 s 263(3)(b) 
51  See for example Bairstow v Queens Moat Houses plc [2000] BCC 1025, 1041-1042. 
 
52  See for example Re DKG Contractors Ltd [1990] BCC 903. 
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coded. Our final dataset comprised 130 cases, the earliest dating from 174253 and the latest in 
November 2017.54		
 
2. Coding the database. 
The cases were coded across 25 categories. The most relevant for this article are Causes of 
Action, claimant, type of company, Basis for Liability, and Time Bands. The Cause of Action 
identified which of the ‘business judgment’ causes of action were present in a case. There 
could be more than one: a case could involve duty of care and wrongful trading claims for 
example. The Basis of Liability category recorded whether liability was imposed for the 
causes of action included in the category Causes of Action. Thus if a case involved a  duty of 
care claim and a conflict of interest claim, and liability was imposed for breach of the duty of 
care, this was recorded as the Basis for Liability and not conflict of interest (though this 
might also have succeeded). However recording disqualification or unfair prejudice as a 
Basis for Liability would not indicate whether liability had been imposed for business 
judgment claims or on another basis. To address this, if liability was imposed for reasons 
unrelated to business judgment, the Basis of Liability was recorded as ‘Other’, thus removing 
those cases from the disqualification/unfair prejudice liability data.  
One team member searched for cases to include in the database using the case selection 
rationale outlined above. Between July-September 2017 and January 2018, two team members 
independently coded the cases. The researchers then reconciled any coding differences between 
September to November 2017 and in January 2018 by referring to independent coding notes 
and by returning to the case reports. Whilst there was a high level of inter-coder reliability, a 
 
53  The Charitable Corporation v Sutton [1742] 9 Modern 349 88 ER 500 
54  Because we were measuring incidence of review of business judgment, there are twelve cases included 
in the database which include first instance and appeal decisions in the same matter ie  25 entries. 
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sample of the cases were reread by two other team members including the Principal 
Investigator. When any coding inconsistencies were found all cases potentially affected were 
reread and recoded if necessary. 
It will be clear that while some of our data was objectively descriptive, for example, 
claimant identity, other aspects involved more complex choices, including the identification of 
cases for inclusion in the database. We do not therefore claim that our study represents an 
absolute truth. For example, in the absence of an agreed definition of what a business judgment 
is, or other empirical studies exploring this, there is room for different views about what cases 
should have been included, but our choices were based on considered rationales. Importantly 
the process adopted ensured consistency in how cases were analysed and coded. Given that the 
aim of this paper is to analyse whether outcomes of challenges to business judgment have 
altered over time, coding consistency and consistent application of the case selection rationales 
allows us to be confident that we compared like with like over time. The fact that others might 
construct the database differently does not affect this. 
 
3. Time band rationales 
 
A critical part of this paper is to examine whether challenges to and liability for directors’ 
business judgments altered over time. We placed cases into one of five time bands reflecting 
critical points in company law over the time, to test whether any changes correlated with 
developments in company law. The five bands were: (1) the period up until 1923; (2) 1924-90; 
(3) 1991-97; (4) 1998-2007; (5) 2008 –30 November 2017. 
The reason for the first band ending is that in 1924 the case of Re City Equitable Fire 
Insurance Company Ltd was decided.55 This was one of the major cases addressing directors’ 
 
55   [1925] Ch  407 
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liability for breach of their duty of care and skill in the history of directorial liability. The action 
was brought by the Official Receiver as liquidator of the directors’ former company. He 
claimed that the directors, though honest, had been negligent in not ascertaining that the 
chairman had made, on behalf of the company, investments and loans, and paid dividends out 
of capital, and these actions were tantamount to fraud. Romer J said that directors had not only 
to act honestly, but must exercise some degree of care and skill.56 The case was subsequently 
regularly relied upon by judges, practitioners and academics for many years as the leading 
authority on the director’s duty of care, and for the fact that Romer J established several 
propositions that encapsulated the law and acted as guiding principles for 60 years. For present 
purposes the most pertinent was that directors need not exhibit in the performance of their 
duties greater skill than may be reasonably expected from a person of their knowledge and 
experience,  meaning that directors were not liable for mere errors of judgment, and they only 
needed to exhibit as much skill as someone as competent or as inexperienced as they were. 57 
The second band runs from 1924 until 1990. In 1991 the decision in Norman v Theodore 
Goddard was decided which commentators have identified as providing a turning point in 
relation to the way that the courts handled the duty of care. 58 In that case Hoffmann J stated 
that section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, dealing with wrongful trading, correctly stated the 
common law duty of care of a director.59 No case had, previously, taken this approach, although 
section 214 had only commenced operation in 1986. Arguably this decision and subsequent 
English case law in the early 1990s saw a change in the approach of the courts rather than an 
 
56 Ibid, 427. 
57 Ibid, 428–429. 
58 [1992] BCC 14. See, P Davies and S Worthington, Gower: Principles of Company Law, 10th ed., 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2016), 479;  J Loughrey, ‘The Director’s Duty of Care and Skill in the Financial Crisis’ in J 
Loughrey (ed.), Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, (Edward 
Elgar, 2013) 14; A Keay, Directors’ Duties, 3rd ed., (LexisNexis, 2016), 225-226 
59 [1992] BCC 14, 15. 
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essential change in the law. 60  The courts merely applied the law in cases such as Re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance61 in a modern context.62 
The third period ends in 1997. In 1998 Re Barings plc (No5) was decided. 63 Although a 
disqualification case, many of the comments of the judge, Jonathan Parker J, related to the 
decisions of directors and breaches of duty, making it a leading case in relation to director’s 
duties.64 Disqualification proceedings were brought against three directors of Barings Bank 
following its collapse. It was found that they were unfit to act as directors (with no allegations 
of dishonesty being made) because they were guilty of serious failures of management and this 
demonstrated incompetence of a high degree. The judge provided some useful propositions 
summarising his view of the law concerning directors’ obligations, including that directors 
have a continuing duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of 
the company’s business to enable them to discharge their duties to the company.65  This 
statement did not exempt non-executives, unlike many earlier cases. 
The fourth period runs until 2007. Most of the directors’ duties codified in the Companies 
Act 2006 came into force on 1 October 2007. As directors could only be liable under the 
codified duties for actions committed after 1 October 2007, it is highly likely that no actions 
against directors would have been commenced until 2008 and certainly no judgment handed 
down until well into 2008.66 Codification of directors’ duties is clearly a critical point in this 
area of company law. Before this the duties were only based on common law rules and 
equitable principles. However section 170(3) and (4) of the Companies Act 2006 provide that 
 
60  Such as Re D’Jan of London Ltd [1993] BCC 646. 
61 [1925] Ch 407. 
62 S Worthington, ‘The Duty to Monitor: A Modern View of the Director’s Duty of Care’ in F Patfield 
(ed), Perspectives on Company Law: 2 (Kluwer Law International, 1997), 189. 
63 [1999] 1 BCLC 433. 
64  J Loughrey, ‘The Director’s Duty of Care and Skill in the Financial Crisis’ in J Loughrey (ed.), 
Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, (Edward Elgar, 2013), 17. 
65 [1999] 1 BCLC 433, 489. 
66  For example, see Re Southern Countries Fresh Foods Ltd [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch) where judgment 
was delivered on 20 November 2008. 
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the general duties will be interpreted and applied in the same way as the common law rules and 
equitable principles, and regard is to be had to these corresponding rules and principles in the 
process of interpreting and applying the codified general duties. Thus, while codification is a 
significant stage in the development of UK company law, the law applied today relies to a 
substantial extent on past decisions. 
The fifth band covers cases from 2008 until November 2017. 
 
E. Results 
1. Company and Claimant Type 
 
As Figure 1 shows the majority of claims involved private companies, most of which 
(72) were owner-managed. There were only six listed public companies, and eleven unlisted 
public companies.  
 










Liquidators brought the most claims, followed by the Insolvency Service, indicating that most 
claims occur in insolvent companies. 
 
 
2. Levels of Challenge Over Time 
 
Figure 3 records the number of cases of each Cause of Action brought against the directors 
across different time bands. It records separately cases involving a single Cause of Action and 
those involving multiple Causes of Action. For example cases in Codes 1, 2, 3 and 9 all include 
duty of care claims but 2, 3 and 9 also include another Cause of Action. Code 5 is zero as it 
was the code for the removed disqualification cases. 






Codes (1-10): 1. Duty of Care (DoC) 2. DoC plus Wrongful Trading (WT) 3. DoC plus duty to act in good faith 
in the company’s interests s 172(1) 4. WT 5. Derivative 6. Disqualification 7. Unfair Prejudice. 8. Failure to take 
account of creditor interests / S S172 (3). 9. Failure to take account of creditor interests / s 172(3) /DOC and / or 
WT. 10.  Duty to act in good faith in the company’s interests s 172(1). 
 
The number of solo duty of care challenges overall is highest in Band 1 (code 1, first column, 
x axis), possibly because alternative causes of action to challenge business judgment were not 
available at this time. Apart from disqualification and duty of care, the highest number of 
challenges were brought in Band 5. Band 5 also contained the second highest number of 
challenges based on duty of care.  
To address the unevenness of the Time Bands, we calculated the average number of 
cases per year brought in each of the different time bands. It records a steady increase in cases 
brought since Time Band 3. We found in Band 1, 0.45 cases were brought per year, in Band 2 
0.10, in Band 3, 2.43, Band 4, 3.3 and in Band 5, 4.4. Thus there is a steady increase in numbers 
of challenges from Band 3. 
Part of the reason for this pattern could be increased case digitisation. A search of 
Westlaw demonstrated that the numbers of cases classified under the key terms ‘directors’ 
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and ‘directors powers and duties’ increased sharply from 2012. However because our data is 
filtered against the case selection rationale, it does not mirror this increase: for example only 
one case in our database dates from 2012, whereas from 2003 there are 7 (when there were 23 
cases and 9 cases respectively for directors' powers and duties).  Again, numbers of 
disqualification cases involving business judgment have falled since Band 3. This suggests 
that increased data capture is not the sole reason for the findings. Furthermore, importantly, 
even if increased data capture has contributed to the higher number of cases recorded in Band 
5, it does not account for increased rates of liability, a matter we explore below. 
 
3. Liability v Non – Liability 
Figures 4a analyses whether directors were found liable for one or more of the Causes of Action 
recorded in the database, or for some other reason.  
There are 15 codes for liability (rather than the 10 codes for Cause of Action) in order 
to capture what liability was imposed for, if not for a ‘business judgment’ Cause of Action. 
Codes 7 -11 comprise these additional grounds. Five cases that appear in these codes are 
unfair prejudice/disqualification cases in which liability was imposed but on grounds other 
than business judgment matters –for example for failing to file accounts. Codes 12-13 are 
multiple bases of liability for the Causes of Action.  
Liability is imposed for disqualification (Code 4 x axis) more than any other cause of 
action, but the next highest Cause of Action is duty of care (Codes 1,12,14 and 15, x axis).  
 










Codes: 1. Duty of Care (DoC) 2.WT. 3. Duty to act bona fide in company’s best interests / s.172. 4. 
Disqualification 5. Unfair Prejudice. 6. Failure to take account of creditor interests / s. 172(3). 7. Breach of 
constitution/s. 171(a) 8. Breach of the duty to act for a proper purpose/s. 171(b) 9. Breach of no conflict/no profit 
duties s.175-177, s. 181 10. Duty to exercise independent judgement/ s. 173 11. Other 12. WT/DOC 13. Creditor 














Codes: 1. Duty of Care (DoC) 2. Wrongful trading (WT). 3. Duty to act in good faith in the company’s interests/ 
s. 172(1) 4. Disqualification 5. Unfair Prejudice. 6. Failure to take account of creditor interests / s. 172(3). 7. 
Breach of constitution/s. 171(a) 8. Breach of the duty to act for a proper purpose/s. 171(b) 9. Breach of no 
conflict/no profit duties s.175-177, s. 181 10. Duty to exercise independent judgement/s.173 11. Other.  
 
Figure 4 (b) shows the basis of liability over time when the cases that are recorded in 
codes 12 -15 involving multiple Causes of Action are added to the single Causes of Action. It 
shows how often liability was imposed overall for each Cause of Action. In all Causes of 
Action, liability was highest in Band 5. The exception is disqualification (code 4, x axis) which 
was highest in Band 3 but has been declining. 
Increased liability may be attributable to more cases being brought, (for reasons 
explored in Part F below), or as discussed, being digitised and so available for analysis.  But 
this cannot account for the rates of liability in the cases shown in Table 1 below. This 
demonstrates that the overall increase in liability in Band 5 is not only because more cases 
were brought or reported, but also because liability was more likely than not to be imposed 






Table 1: Percentage of cases in each Cause of Action in each time band in which liability was imposed for that 
Cause of Action. Disqualification and unfair prejudice cases in which liability was imposed for reasons 







1. General Reasons for Increased Liability 
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The majority of cases in which liability has been imposed involved claims brought by office-
holders of the companies that have been wronged (Figure 2). Nearly all are liquidators where 
the company is insolvent, and the liquidator’s role is primarily to recover as much as he or 
she can for creditors, which usually involves investigating the actions of the directors of the 
insolvent company. The number of companies that have been subject to insolvent regimes, 
primarily for our purposes administration and liquidation, has increased in the past 30 years.67 
For instance in 1988 there were approximately 8,000 liquidations but in later years that has 
risen to as many as around 20,000 in some years and regularly well in excess of 12,000. In 
2017 there were 15,660.68 In contrast in 1960 there were only 1,563, 3,689 in 1970 and 6,890 
in 1980. Liquidations have been increasing for many years.  
Administrators and liquidators can bring proceedings if they believe that directors 
breached their duties or were engaged in activity that was in contravention of some legislative 
provision, such as wrongful trading under section 214 of the Insolvency Act and office-
holders are more likely to initiate proceedings than companies for several reasons.69 
Companies rarely litigate against their directors as they take action by way of board decision, 
and wrongdoing directors and their associates often control boards or boards are embarrassed 
about proceeding against one or more of their own number.70 While office-holders are 
cautious about instituting proceedings, they have a highly investigative role which often leads 




mation/statistics/historicdata/HDmenu.htm> accessed 25 February 2018. 
68 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attA.C.hment_data/file/675931/Insolvency_Statistics
_-_web.pdf> accessed 25 February 2018. 
69  Administrators have only recently been able to bring wrongful trading proceedings:  Insolvency Act 
1986  s 246ZB. 
70  For a discussion of such reasons and others, see A Keay, ‘An Assessment of Private Enforcement 
Actions for Directors’ Breaches of Duty’ (2014) 33 Civil Justice Quarterly 76 
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Not infrequently in insolvent companies directorial action that might be impugned has 
contributed to the plight of directors’ companies.  
Given that the office-holders’ job is to recover as much money for creditors as they 
can, providing that they are advised by their lawyers that the action against a director has a 
reasonable chance of success they will almost be obliged to institute proceedings. Courts 
respect the discretion of office-holders to decide what they do in the course of administering 
the affairs of an insolvent company and are reluctant to say that office-holders have acted 
wrongly in not taking a particular kind of action. However, if an office-holder fails to do 
something which creditors believed should be done, creditors have the power to apply to the 
courts for the office-holder’s action or lack of action to be reviewed.71  
In sum, greater numbers of insolvencies in the last 30 years are likely to have led to 
more actions by liquidators and administrators, which will have a significant effect on overall 
levels of claims brought against directors (Figure 3) because these are the most likely parties 
to institute claims against directors. Furthermore, as a result of their investigative powers, 
such claims may be stronger than those brought by, for example, shareholders, and may 
therefore explain increasing rates of director liability (Table 1). Yet the substantial increase in 
the amount of proceedings commenced by insolvency office-holders might, for two reasons, 
be regarded as surprising.  
First, funding is a critical issue for liquidators and it might be thought that it would be 
difficult to obtain. Yet over the past 15 years or so office-holders have been able to secure 
litigation funding.72 Litigation funding has,  notwithstanding the introduction in April 2016 of 
 
71  For example, see Insolvency Act 1986, s 168(5) and Sch B1, para 74. 
72  K Crinson and S Morphet, ‘Funding for Actions rought by Insolvency Officeholders’ (2011) 24 
Insolvency Intelligence 108; A Jay, ‘Funding Insolvency Litigation : a New Dawn’ (2015) Corporate Rescue 
and Insolvency 183; C. Bowman and K. Hurford, ‘Litigation Funding for Insolvency Claims’ (2016) 13 
International Corporate Rescue 11. 
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the  ‘Jackson reforms’ appeared to be quite readily available for insolvency litigation.73 When 
the  reforms were first applied to civil litigation, insolvency litigation was provided with a 
temporary ‘carve-out’ until April 2016. Since April 2016 office-holders are no longer entitled, 
as they once were, to claim besides a damages award, the legal costs, the cost of any conditional 
fee agreement (CFA) uplift, and the cost of the after the event (ATE) insurance premium from 
the respondent.74 To make up for some drop off in CFA and ATE funding, there are 
indications that since April 2016 there has been an increase in third party funding of office-
holders and also office-holders, particularly those who are members of the largest accounting 
firms, establishing their own funds for use in insolvency litigation.75 In June 2018 the Law 
Society stated that there is a vigorous market for the funding of insolvency claims.76   
Secondly, literature has suggested that it is questionable whether bringing proceedings 
against directors would be worthwhile, as a good portion of directors who might be subject to 
proceedings are likely to be impecunious.77 Many directors of smaller companies will 
themselves become bankrupt as, inter alia, they will have given personal guarantees for their 
insolvent company’s debts,78 and thus any claim against them would not be paid at all or only 
to a limited extent, depending on any payout from the directors’ bankruptcies. 
 
73  Contained in Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report  (TSO, 2009) and found in the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
74  For discussion of it and the potential effect on insolvency practitioners, see the reports prepared by P 
Walton for R3: ‘The Likely Effect of the Jackson Reforms on Insolvency Litigation – an Empirical 
Investigation’ (April 2014) :  
<https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/JA.C.kson_Campaign/JA.C.kson_Reforms_Insolvency_Litigat
ion_April_2014.pdf> accessed 9 July 2018; ‘Insolvency Litigation and the Jackson Reforms : An Update’, April 
2016:  
<https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/research_reports/bus_distress_index/Insolvency_Litigation_an
d_the_JA.C.kson_Reforms_-_An_Update_April_2016_FINAL.pdf> accessed 9 July 2018. 
75  P Walton, ‘Insolvency Litigation – Past, Present and Future’,  paper presented to the Insolvency 
Lawyers’ Association Academic Forum, LSE, March 2017. 
76  June 2018 (in response to Question 5 of the BEIS consultation) <https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-
campaigns/consultation-responses/beis-consultation-on-insolvency-and-corporate-governance/ > accessed 9 July 
2018. 
77  See, R Williams, ‘What Can We Expect to Gain from Reforming the Insolvent Trading Remedy?’ 
(2015) 78 MLR 55, 73, 77- 78. Also, see R Williams, ‘Civil Recovery From Delinquent Directors’ (2015) 15 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 311. 
78  Ibid. Julian Franks and Oren Sussman found that in 50-60 per cent. of small bank-financed companies,  
directors had granted guarantees in relation to money owed to banks : ‘An Empirical Study of Financial Distress 
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It is possible that the codification of the general duties of directors in the Companies 
Act 2006 could have contributed to increased rates of liability between Band 4 and Band 5 
(Table 1). Codification made the duties more accessible to directors and others alike. Yet 
although an important step, it seems unlikely that codification would be the sole reason for 
the increase in directors being held liable, because, for the most part, codification did not lead 
to a major change of law.  The Companies Act 2006 section 170(3) states that the codified 
duties are based on common law rules and equitable principles, which remain highly relevant 
as the codified duties are to be interpreted and applied in the same way as the corresponding 
common law rules and equitable principles and regard is to be had to these in the process of 
interpreting and applying the codified duties.79 Much of the judicial discussion of the codified 
duties has been informed by these common law rules and equitable principles.80 This is well-
illustrated by some of the cases addressing the duty to promote the success of the company in 
section 172(1) such as Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM Langport Ltd, included in the 
database. In this case Warren J said that: ‘They [the previous duty and section 172(1)] come 
to the same thing with the modern formulation giving a more readily understood definition of 
the scope of the duty.’ 81  
Having said that, codification might indeed have affected levels of litigation. One 
study, undertaken just before the codified duties came into force, examined the public views 
of practitioners from large commercial law firms concerning how directors should act in light 
of the new duties and found that there was uncertainty and diverging opinions amongst the 
firms. The study found that most lawyers were agnostic about whether section 172, for 
instance, would alter the outcome of directors’ decisions in the ordinary course of business.82 
 
of Small Bank-Financed UK Companies : A Reassessment of English Insolvency Law,’ paper presented at the 
16th Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, New Orleans, 2001.  
79  Companies Act 2006 s 170(4) 
80  A Keay, Directors’ Duties, 3rd ed., (LexisNexis, 2016), 86. 
81  [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch), [52].   
82 J Loughrey, A Keay and L Cerioni ‘Legal Pracitioners, Enlightened Shareholder Value and the 
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On the one hand this might have caused both lawyers advising directors to settle any 
proposed or actual claims made against them for breach of duty, as the attitude of the courts 
could not be predicted, and lawyers advising prospective or actual claimants to be 
circumspect in taking action, certainly in going as far as a trial. On the other hand, it might 
have led lawyers to advise directors who were threatened with action to defend the 
proceedings fiercely given the uncertainties, and it might have encouraged some of those 
advising  prospective claimants to recommend instigating proceedings against directors. 
The increase in liability could be a consequence of the fact that over the past 30 years 
we have experienced the gradual emergence of new causes of action or a revision of existing 
ones (Figure 3). An example of the latter is director disqualification. In the mid-1980s the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA) was enacted and it made 
disqualification more of a possibility, for while disqualification was originally introduced in 
legislation in 1947 it was not until the CDDA that disqualification was regularly sought 
against directors and had real teeth.  
As far as new causes of action, the Insolvency Act 1986 introduced wrongful trading83 
and in the late 1980s the Court of Appeal accepted that directors must, when their company is 
in severe financial difficulties, take into account the interests of their company’s creditors 
when making decisions.84 The addition of new causes of action gave claimants more weapons 
to wield against directors. Claimants can plead more than one cause of action in proceedings 
against directors and liability has been imposed on more than one basis (Table 4a).85  
Consequently it could be submitted that directorial accountability has increased in the sense 
that directors’ action  may now be challenged on more bases, making it more difficult for 
directors to avoid liability. It certainly grants potential claimants more room to manoeuvre 
 
Shaping of Corporate Governance’ (2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 79, 90. 
83  Insolvency Act 1986 s 214. 
84  Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd (1988) 4 BCC 30. 
85  For example Roberts v Frohlich [2011] EWHC (Ch) 257; [2012] BCC 407. 
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when considering what can be alleged against directors when considering whether to initiate 
proceedings against directors.  
Liquidators, who, as mentioned above, are the most frequent claimants against 
directors who are found liable, can rely on section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and this 
can facilitate the pursuit of proceedings. Section 212 covers ‘misfeasance’ and permits a 
liquidator to bring proceedings against directors where the latter have ‘misapplied or retained, 
or become accountable for, any money or other property of the company, or been guilty of 
any misfeasance or breach of any fiduciary or other duty in relation to the company.’ It was 
designed to facilitate recovery of assets improperly dealt with, and to enable  liquidators to 
obtain compensation for misconduct which had caused loss to companies.86 Section 212 itself 
does not provide for a cause of action but merely gives liquidators a summary procedure to 
bring matters to court.87 This permits liquidators to avoid some of the expense and delay 
which inevitably attends the prosecution of ordinary legal proceedings.88  
The provision enables liquidators to rely on several causes of action in any 
proceedings, including anything that can be regarded as a breach of duty or breach of trust. 
The case of Roberts v Frohlich89 is a prime example of the use of the provision. In that case 
the liquidator took action against directors under section 212 for breach of the duty of care 
and breach of the duty to act in the best interests of the company and not taking creditors’ 
interests into account when the company was insolvent. Also, the liquidator argued that there 
was a breach of the wrongful trading provision. The judge found the directors liable under all 
three causes of action.90  
 
86  Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co (No.2) [1896] 2 Ch. 279,  283 and 288; Re London & Colonial Finance Co 
(1897) 13 TLR  576 
87  Cavendish-Bentinck v Fenn (1887) 12 App Cas 652, 669; Re City Equitable Fire Insurance 
Co [1925] Ch 407, 527; Re B. Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd [1955] Ch 634, 647-648; Cohen v Selby 
[2001] 1 BCLC 176, 183. 
88  Proceedings are not initiated in the ordinary way but through streamlined procedures in the 
Business and  Property Courts. 
89  [2011] EWHC (Ch) 257; [2012] BCC 407. 
90  ibid,  [109], [113]. 
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It is possible that more cases of liability were recorded in the last two time bands 
(Figure 4b) as there was likely to have been an increase in commercial activity during these 
periods. Arguably if there are more transactions entered into and other actions occurring, 
there will be a commensurate increase in liability.  
However overall there has also been an increased rate of liability in the cases that are 
brought, particularly in Band 5 (Table 1). The causes are not obvious, as canvassed above: it 
is not due to changes in the substantive law. Possibly claimants and advisors have become 
better at identifying which cases are more likely to be successful, and at framing claims in 
order to have better chances of success. Another possibility arises from the fact that business 
judgment Causes of Action are pleaded alongside other causes of action such as conflicts of 
interest. When this occurs, the courts’ approach to business judgment claims may be coloured 
by their views of the directors’ behaviour more generally. If claims coming before the courts 
are more serious then this would explain increased rates of liability. It is also possible that 
courts may have become more willing to impose liability in challenges to business judgment.  
A further caveat is that while our findings show an increase in proceedings instituted 
against directors for the Causes of Action identified in this study, (Figure 3, especially bands 
4 and 5), this only covers cases that have ended up with a hearing as our findings are based 
on reported cases. We did not determine the number of cases that were instituted and that did 
not come to a hearing as this information is not publicly available.91 Actions could be 
commenced and then discontinued for various reasons, such as the case was settled between 
the parties before reaching a hearing. While levels of reported cases may reflect actual levels 
of litigation against public company directors, experience tells us that there will be many 
actions involving private companies that will settle out of court. 92 
 
91  See J Armour, B Black, B Cheffins and R Nolan ‘Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: United 
Kingdom vs United States’ (2009) 6 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 687, 697-698 outlining how they accessed  
this information in the context of public companies.  




2. Reasons for increased liability related to particular causes of action 
 
(a) Duty of Care and Duty to take into account the interests of the company/Section 
172(1) 
  
Figure 4c shows that, excepting disqualification, the cause of action that was most 
successfully employed against directors overall was breach of the duty of care, albeit only by 
one case in each of the second and third time bands. While the number of cases in which 
directors were found liable for a breach of the duty of care in the first band was not 
exceptionally high, it was the highest of all the bands. This was a long period, covering 55 
years, from the time of the reporting of the first group of cases in 1869 (this is leaving aside 
the 1742 decision of The Charitable Corporation v Sutton93) until 1923. Also, of importance 
was the fact that during this period there were fewer causes of action available to claimants. 
At this point the legislature had not intervened very much in how directors acted, and it was 
left to the common law and judicial development to provide for liability. Breach of the duty 
of care is an example of this.  
The second band covered an even longer period of 67 years, but recorded only one 
verdict against directors. The likely reason is that the decision in Re City Equitable Fire 
Insurance in 1924 (and reported in 1925) which marked the beginning of our second band, 
was held by courts, and stated in academic and practitioner literature, as laying down a 
subjective test as far as determining whether a director was liable or not. 94 Thus, courts were 
reluctant to hold directors liable unless it could be demonstrated clearly that a director had 
 
93  [1742] 9 Modern 349; 88 ER 500. 
94  [1925] Ch 407. 
33 
 
acted in a manner that they should not have, given the director’s personal circumstances, 
experience and skill. 95 In light of this it is probable that lawyers would have advised potential 
claimants that the case provided for a subjective test and, hence, establishing liability against 
a director was difficult, and action was best avoided. This undoubtedly dissuaded potential 
claimants from initiating proceedings and it is notable that there is a collapse in the number of 
duty of care claims brought in Band 2 compared with Band 1 (Figure 3).  
The duty of care then remained ill-defined for many years.96 The rise in liability in 
Band 4 (Figure 4b) occurred after the decisions delivered in Norman v Theodore Goddard97 
and Re Barings Bank (No5).98 The former, while holding that the respondent director was not 
liable, laid down the principle, subsequently applied by several cases, that directors could be 
liable for a breach of duty if they either failed to attain a standard of care in line with their 
experience and skill or if they failed to act in a way that a reasonable person in their position 
would have acted. This, therefore, enabled claimants to succeed if they could establish the 
fulfilment of an objective test as well as, or as an alternative to, a subjective test. This meant 
that directors not only had to act in line with his or her own ability and experience, but also  
as reasonable directors would have acted in the circumstances, even if the respondent director 
was inexperienced or lacked certain skills or abilities. Re Barings Bank (No5), inter alia, a 
disqualification case, placed more restrictions on directors delegating responsibility to others 
and made them more accountable for what their delegates had done or not done.99 Jonathan 
Parker J in this case indicated that he required directors to supervise delegates appropriately.  
 
95  S Worthington, ‘The Duty to Monitor: A Modern View of the Director’s Duty of Care’ in F Patfield 
(ed), Perspectives on Company Law: 2 (Kluwer Law International, 1997), 189. 
96  Daniels v Anderson (1995) 13 ACLC 614, 656 
97  [1992] BCC 14. 
98  [1999] 1 BCLC 433. 
99  J Loughrey, ‘The Director’s Duty of Care and Skill in the Financial Crisis’ in J Loughrey (ed.), 
Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, (Edward Elgar, 2013), 25–26. 
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Table 1 suggests that directors are more likely to be held liable in respect of a claim 
for breach of duty of care in more recent times. The reason for the increase in liability could 
be, as adverted to above, that the test, since 1991 when Norman v Theodore Goddard was 
decided, has been a mixed subjective and objective test and arguably it is easier to establish 
liability.  
However the increase between Bands 4 and 5 is difficult to explain by reference to the 
substantive law. Table 1 shows that there was an increase in liability in the fifth band in cases 
when a claimant sought relief on the basis of a breach of duty of care and a breach of the duty 
to act in the best interests of the company. The only thing that changed with the last time 
band compared with earlier ones in terms of legal developments was the codification of the 
duties, which may have impacted on levels of litigation. However, the two sections that cover 
duty of care and duty to act in good faith, sections 174 and 172 respectively, did not appear to 
usher in new law. Section 174 is almost identical to the test for whether there was a breach of 
duty set out in Norman v Theodore Goddard and applied in subsequent cases. Hoffmann J 
had said in Norman v Theodore Goddard that a mixed objective and subjective approach was 
to be applied to the common law breach of duty of care and this point was replicated in 
section 174, so that it does not differ in substance from the law as it stood under the common 
law at the time of the enactment of the codified duties.  
While section 172(1) is not expressed in the same terms as its precursor, the former 
duty to act in good faith which was provided for under case law, the cases decided under 
section 172 have held that the duty encompassed by section 172 is merely a modern 
formulation of the duty to act in good faith that existed pre-codification.100 There was 
 
100  For example, see Re West Coast Capital (LIOS) Ltd [2008] CSOH 72; 2008 Scot (D) 16/5; Cobden 
Investments Ltd v RWM Langport Ltd [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch); Madoff Securities International Ltd (in liq) v 
Raven [2013] EWHC 3147 (Comm);  [2014] Lloyd's Rep FC 95,  [260]; Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd 
[2013] EWHC 2876 (Ch.); [2014] BCC 337.  
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however a great deal of discussion and uncertainty about section 172  when it was introduced 
which, as canvassed earlier, may have encouraged more litigation.101  
 
(b) Wrongful Trading 
Figure 4b reveals that as far as the cases where wrongful trading constituted at least one of 
the causes of action, there was a healthy number of cases in which directors were held liable 
in Band 2. The number of cases decreased in Band 3, and then in Bands 4 and 5 they 
increased. While numbers were relatively low, the increase in Band 5 was sizeable  with the 
number of cases growing by 150 per cent when compared with the Band 4. The reason for the 
decrease from Band 2 to Band 3 could well be because wrongful trading was introduced in 
Band 2  and commentators expressed optimism about this new cause of action having an 
effect on errant directors,102 which could have been reflected by the judges. By Band 3 there 
was more pessimism about the usefulness of wrongful trading,103 certainly in relation to the 
way that the section had been drafted.  Arguably this continued in Band 4, and in particular 
following cases like Re Continental Assurance Co. of London, where the liquidator failed in 
his action after a very long and expensive trial.104 It is unclear why there was an increase in 
cases brought and rates of liability in Band 5 (Table 1). There has been no change in the 
provision or substantive case-law addressing wrongful trading. The increase is, in some ways, 
surprising as establishing wrongful trading is not easily done, for a several reasons,105 and 
commentators have commented regularly on the relative impotence of the provision.106 Given 
 
101   J Loughrey, A Keay and L Cerioni ‘Legal Pracitioners, Enlightened Shareholder Value and the 
Shaping of Corporate Governance’ (2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 79.  
102  For example, see D Prentice, ‘Creditors’ Interests and Director’s Duties’ (1990) 10 OJLS 265, 277; F 
Oditah, ‘Wrongful Trading’ [1990] LMCLQ 205, 222. 
103  For example, see R Schulte, ‘Enforcing wrongful trading as a standard of conduct for directors and a 
remedy for creditors: the special case of corporate insolvency’ (1999) 20 Company Lawyer  80, 81 
104  [2001] BPIR 733. 
105  See, A Keay,  Company Directors’ Responsibilities to Creditors (Routledge, 2007); A Keay, 
‘Wrongful Trading: Problems and Proposals’ (2014) 65 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 63. 
106  See, ibid; R Schulte, ‘Enforcing wrongful trading as a standard of conduct for directors and a remedy 
for creditors: the special case of corporate insolvency’ (1999) 20 Company Lawyer  80. 
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the high number of liquidations in the years between the enactment of section 214 and the 
present, the 12 cases of liability across Bands 2-5 (Figure 4b) does appear to be relatively 
low, but we must take into account the relatively low number of proceedings instituted.107 
The low number of cases commenced is surprising given the high numbers of liquidations in 
the past 30 years. As mentioned earlier, during this period the number of liquidations 
exceeded 12,000 every year and more often than not was near 20,000. 
 
(c) Disqualification 
The number of disqualification cases brought against directors in our database has decreased 
since Band 3 (Figure 3). The introduction of undertakings in the Insolvency Act 2000 in Band 
4, which enabled disqualifications to occur without court involvement could be a significant 
factor in this.108 It is also possible that, as we only included cases in which business judgment 
is mentioned, there has been a decrease in directors pleading a business judgment defence or 
justification in disqualification cases. It might mean that in many cases the Secretary of State 
who brings proceedings for disqualification might be alleging grounds for disqualification 
that did not involve any business judgment being exercised by directors. Nevertheless in 
Band 5 the rate of liability is the second highest of the time bands (Table 1).  
 
(d) Unfair prejudice 
While Figure 4b shows that there was only one unfair prejudice case in which a 
director was liable in each of Bands 3 and 4 (it was not an option in the years covered by 
Band 1 as it was only introduced,  in a different form, in 1948), where the term business 
judgment or similar has been used in the judgment of the court, there was a large increase (by 
 
107  R Williams, ‘What Can We Expect to Gain from Reforming the Insolvent Trading Remedy?’ (2015) 78 
MLR 55. 
108 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 s 7(2A) amended by Insolvency Act 2000 s 6. 
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eight fold) in Band 5. The fact that there were so few cases in Bands 3 and 4 in which 
business judgment was referred to is surprising given the fact that there were large numbers 
of unfair prejudice claims reported overall. There is no apparent reason linked to the 
substantive law for the increase in numbers of cases brought (Figure 3) and the increased rate 
of liability (Table 1) in Band 5.  
 
(e) Failure to take account of creditor interests/section 172(3) 
Figure 4b also records a clear increase in the number of cases where directors have been held 
liable when failing to take into account the interests of creditors. The failure to take into 
account the interests of creditors was first recognised in England and Wales as the basis for a 
director’s liability in 1988 (at the end of the years covered by Band 2) in the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd .109  This decision was not 
included in the database as it involved a lack of good faith, nor were other cases in which it 
was clear that the court had reached a decision based on the directors’ lack of good faith. It is 
perhaps surprising that there were not any cases during Band 3 involving a director being 
found liable or not liable. The reason could be that the decision in Liquidator of West Mercia 
Safetywear v Dodd did not set out the nature of the duty in any detail (the judgment was 
relatively brief) and prospective claimants did not feel confident in bringing proceedings. It is 
arguable that during the 1990s there was substantial uncertainty as to when the duty was 
triggered, not only in England but in other common law jurisdictions.110  
The increase in the number of cases where there was liability, from Band 4 to Band 5, 
could be due to one or two reasons. First, the decisions in Band 4 had provided further 
explanation concerning the duty which enabled lawyers advising potential claimants to 
 
109  (1988) 4 BCC 30 
110  See A Keay, ‘The Director's Duty to Take into Account the Interests of Company Creditors : When is it 
Triggered?’ (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 31. 
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provide better indications of what needed to be proved.111 For example the decision in Colin 
Gwyer v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd set out the test that should be applied if the directors 
had not considered creditor interests but there was no finding that they lacked good faith, 
namely that the courts should consider whether a director in the position of the respondent 
directors could have reasonably considered the impugned action to be in the interests of the 
company.112 Secondly, the duty was codified in section 172(3) of the Companies Act 2006. 
While codification did not involve a change in the law, but was a confirmation of the 
common law developments, the existence of a specific provision might have highlighted the 
duty more and it might have encouraged more liquidators to take proceedings. The relatively 
high employment of this cause of action is perhaps surprising given the fact that arguably 
there still remain several uncertainties in relation to what has to be established in bringing 
proceedings under this cause of action.113 
In sum, most cases where liability was imposed on directors in Band 2 was at the end 
of the period due to the advent of new causes of action such as wrongful trading in 1986 and 
the toughening up of disqualification in 1986 when the CDDA became law. We find a 
gradual increase in liability beginning with Band 3 (see Figure 4b), perhaps because of a 
number of factors, including the increased corpus of causes of action which can be employed 
against directors. This point seems to be borne out by the fact that, as far as the cases where 
liability was imposed in each band, there is a greater spread of liability across causes of 
action through the time bands. It is possible that the widening of the tests for liability for 
breach of the duty of care (with the inclusion of an objective test) also led to an increase in 
 
111  For example, Re Pantone 485 Ltd [2002] 1 BCLC 266; Colin Gwyer v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd 
[2002] EWHC 2748 (Ch); [2003] BCC 885; Re MDA Investment Management Ltd  (Ch) [2004] EWHC 42 (Ch); 
[2005] BCC 783. 
112  [2002] EWHC 2748 (Ch); [2003] BCC 885. In some cases although the director appeared to lack good 
faith, the test in Colin Gwyer was nevethless applied. These cases were included. 
113  See, A Keay,  Company Directors’ Responsibilities to Creditors (Routledge, 2007); A Keay, 
‘Directors’ Duties and Creditors’ Interests’ (2014) 130 LQR 443. 
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successful cases. Rates of liability across the combined Causes of Action is highest in Band 5 
which suggests that directors being held more accountable than in previous eras for business 





This paper analysed how the numbers of reported cases involving i) causes of action that 
challenge directors’ business judgment have altered over time, and ii) how levels and rates of 
liability have altered over time.  
We found evidence that legal developments have had some influence on numbers of 
cases brought in relation to business judgment. Thus in relation to duty of care, the study 
found that following the case of Re City Equitable Fire Insurance in 1924, which was 
interpreted as making it difficult to succeed in a duty of care claim against a director, the 
numbers of cases involving the duty of care cause of action collapsed, recovered a little after 
Re Barings, a high profile case involving public company directors, and then significantly 
increased after 2007, in line with a general trend across most causes of action in this time 
period. Meanwhile numbers of disqualification cases brought dropped in Band 4 after the 
introduction of undertakings in 2001 that provided for disqualification without court 
involvement. In addition the availability of more causes of action upon which to mount a 
challenge to directors’ business judgment may be a factor in the overall increase in cases 
brought.  Increases in the number of insolvencies could be another factor, as could changes in 
the numbers of cases captured by the electronic databases.  
Turning to liability, we found that not only absolute levels of liability but also overall 
proportionate rates of liability have risen since 2007, and rates of liability in duty of care 
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cases has steadily climbed across time.  These changes are not always linked to changes in 
the substantive law. Increases in absolute levels of liability could be linked to increases in 
numbers of cases brought or cases reported but increased rates of liability cannot be linked to 
these factors. This finding opens up avenues for future empirical research as to the causes of 
this phenomenon, which could be linked to changes in the judicial approach to applying the 
law; more carefully crafted and evidenced claimant cases; or that the behaviour coming 
before the courts is more worthy of sanction.   
Finally we found that the proposition that courts will not review directors’ business 
decisions is incorrect. Across all time bands and causes of action, challenges to business 
judgment were brought, and liability imposed, following review of business judgment. 
Sometimes liability was determined solely on considerations of (poor) business judgment, 
whereas in other instances, liability for business judgment was enmeshed with factors such as 
conflicts of interest. Litigation was concentrated in private, primarily insolvent, companies   
Directors of large public companies remain largely insulated from being held accountable in 
the courts for business judgments, but this is not because those business judgments are immune 
from judicial review.  
 
 
